Mentees will conduct domain-specific jurisdiction analyses for a proposed permanent congressional oversight body with investigative authority over high-risk technical domains, including frontier AI development, intelligence and surveillance, and biosecurity. Each mentee takes one domain and produces a structured analysis that identifies existing oversight gaps, required investigative authorities, and institutional design requirements, which feed into a comparative jurisdiction report and a larger working paper on congressional oversight architecture.
About the project
Congress cannot independently evaluate the safety practices, development trajectories, or deployment decisions of frontier AI developers. It relies on executive branch agencies and industry for its understanding of AI risks. Both sources respond to interests other than the legislature's. The Office of Technology Assessment provided independent technical analysis from 1972 to 1995. It was defunded and never replaced. This project contributes to the design of a permanent, expert-staffed body under Congress with subpoena power, broad investigative access, and fast-track legislative authority. The attached project brief describes the institutional concept, design features, and precedents in detail. Each SPAR mentee takes one prospective oversight domain and answers five questions through a shared analytical framework: (a) what entities and activities fall within the domain, (b) what existing oversight structures cover the domain and where gaps exist, (c) what investigative authorities the body would need in that domain, (d) what institutional design features the domain requires (staffing expertise, clearance levels, information-sharing protocols), and (e) what precedents from analogous oversight regimes (global, federal, and state) are instructive. Three candidate domains are available. Intelligence and surveillance covers AI-enabled inference by intelligence agencies, predictive policing, and IC AI programs. Biosecurity covers dual-use AI-biology research, high-containment lab governance, and AI-enabled biological threat detection. Frontier AI development covers training runs, safety evaluations, deployment decisions, and lab governance at frontier AI companies. Each mentee produces a structured domain analysis. The synthesis across domains produces a comparative jurisdiction report. Both outputs feed into a larger working paper on congressional oversight architecture.
See more details in the project proposal: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fmUzAbQwo94MFCZq5wKk5PSuZh9VyyY6VgVSAay4zMM/edit?usp=sharing
Theory of change
Frontier AI systems pose catastrophic risks that require legislative responses. Congress currently lacks the independent technical capacity to evaluate those risks, investigate the companies and government programs developing frontier AI, or legislate effectively based on its own understanding. It depends on executive agencies that serve the president and on industry actors that serve shareholders. A technically competent body under Congress with investigative authority would give the legislature independent capacity to oversee frontier AI development and government AI deployment. This project produces the domain-specific jurisdiction analyses that determine what that body would need to function effectively across the domains where AI risks are most acute. The domain analyses identify concrete oversight gaps, required investigative authorities, and institutional design requirements, providing an actionable foundation for the body's design. The attached project brief describes the full institutional concept and its precedents.
Your role
Mentees will work as independent researchers on their assigned domain, with structured guidance. Each mentee selects one of the three candidate domains (intelligence and surveillance, biosecurity, or frontier AI development) based on their background and interests. During weeks 1-2, mentees review the project brief, survey the existing oversight landscape in their domain, and identify key sources. During weeks 3-8, mentees conduct the core analysis using the five-question analytical framework. During weeks 9-12, mentees draft their domain analysis and contribute to the comparative synthesis across domains.
Weekly check-ins with the mentor will focus on analytical direction, source identification, and draft review. Mentees will also share progress with each other to identify cross-domain patterns as they emerge. Final outputs will be clearly attributed to each mentee in the larger working paper.
Prerequisites
Required: strong analytical writing skills and familiarity with at least one of the project's three domains (intelligence/surveillance, biosecurity, or frontier AI development). Familiarity can be technical or policy-oriented. A biosecurity researcher with lab experience and a policy student with national security coursework are equally welcome.
Desired: coursework or experience in public policy, national security, law, science and technology policy, or AI governance. Prior research experience at the graduate or professional level. Familiarity with U.S. government structure and congressional operations.
Technical backgrounds are welcome. Mentees with deep domain expertise and limited policy experience will receive additional guidance on the institutional analysis components. The ideal team has complementary backgrounds so that each mentee brings existing knowledge to a different domain.
If you aren't sure you fit, apply anyway!
Location preference
East Coast Time would help with setting up meetings. I am based in Washington, D.C.
Application question(s)
- The project identifies three candidate oversight domains (intelligence and surveillance, biosecurity, frontier AI development). Propose one additional domain that you believe a technically competent congressional oversight body should cover. Briefly describe what entities and activities fall within this domain, identify one significant gap in existing oversight, and explain why this domain requires the kind of investigative authority described in the project brief. (max 250 words)
- Suppose the body has completed its first major investigation and is preparing to fast-track legislation to the floor. What should that first piece of legislation address, and why should it take priority over other possible outputs? Be specific about the problem the legislation targets, the domain it falls within, and why acting on it first would strengthen the body's institutional credibility. (max 200 words)
- A senior member of Congress who chairs a committee with overlapping jurisdiction objects that the proposed body duplicates existing oversight and encroaches on the committee's authority. How would you respond? What changes would you make, if any, to assuage the Chair's concerns? (max 250 words)
About the mentor
Michael Endrias is an AI Policy Fellow at the Institute for AI Policy and Strategy, placed at the Legal Advocates for Safe Science and Technology (LASST), where he supports frontier AI accountability litigation and legal research. He also supports the legislation team at the Future of Privacy Forum (FPF), where his work covers tracking chatbot regulation and constitutional constraints on AI legislation. Previously, he researched government surveillance technologies and law enforcement oversight at the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (S.T.O.P.). Michael is a J.D. candidate at Howard University School of Law, concentrating in privacy, surveillance, and internet law. His research at IAPS focuses on designing a permanent, technically competent congressional oversight body with investigative authority over frontier AI development, government AI programs, and adjacent high-risk technical domains.