Most discussions of genetic engineering attribution focus on post-hoc forensic identification — tracing an engineered pathogen back to its source after release. This project will map the stages between initial intent and execution of a biological attack using engineered pathogens, and examine whether and how identification, evidentiary, or accountability mechanisms could apply earlier in that pipeline, not only at the point of forensic investigation.
About the project
This project builds on my earlier work examining evidentiary standards and governance frameworks for genetic engineering attribution. That work focused primarily on how attribution evidence becomes actionable after an incident has occurred. This project extends the inquiry upstream: rather than treating attribution solely as a forensic capability triggered by an event, it asks what the full pathway from intent to execution looks like, and where along that pathway meaningful identification, evidentiary, or deterrent opportunities already exist — or could be built.
Methods
- Literature review mapping the stages of biological weapons development
- Potential comparative review of how other domains structure custody, monitoring, or accountability across a similar pipeline
- Interviews with technical experts working at different points along this pipeline to understand what identification or accountability mechanisms already function informally at each stage
Key Research Questions A) Mapping the Pipeline
- What are the discrete stages between initial intent and execution of a biological attack using engineered pathogens?
- What data, technical signatures, or institutional touchpoints exist at each stage that could plausibly support identifying the actors involved? B) Gaps and Priorities
- Where are the current gaps between what's technically and institutionally possible at each stage of the pipeline versus what would be needed for meaningful identification or accountability?
- Which stages of the pipeline are most neglected relative to their potential value for risk reduction?
Expected Output The primary output will be a report or peer-reviewed paper.
Background reading: -https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/tracing-engineered-biothreats-with-ai-forensics-five-steps-to-improve-attribution/#post-heading
Theory of change
Advances in AI are accelerating genetic engineering capabilities, increasing the risk that malicious actors could design dangerous pathogens. Robust attribution frameworks are essential for deterrence and accountability in this landscape, but attribution evidence is only useful if governance structures exist to act on it. This project develops the policy infrastructure needed to make AI-powered attribution tools operationally meaningful.
Your role
The mentee should be comfortable working independently. I'll provide clear guidance and will be available for regular check-ins. The mentee will be a co-author of the final report/paper.
Prerequisites
Required:
- some previous research experience
- strong writer
- ability to work independently
(some knowledge of biosecurity is helpful but not required)
Application question(s)
Question 1: Choose one stage in the pathway from intent to execution of a biological attack (e.g., sequence design, DNA synthesis, cultivation, or release). Identify a specific piece of evidence or technical signature that could plausibly exist at that stage, who would need access to it for it to be useful, and what would make it strong versus weak in a legal or diplomatic context. (250 words max) Question 2: What is one assumption underlying this proposal that you think is most likely to be wrong or incomplete? How would that change the research approach if you're right? (bullet points, 200 words max)
About the mentor
Anemone Franz is a visiting research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where she focuses on biosafety and biosecurity. Before joining AEI, Dr. Franz worked as a clinical trial physician at the biotech startup Alvea and as an adviser for the nonprofit 80,000 Hours. She was a 2024 fellow in the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity program at Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and a 2025 International Mid-Career Biosecurity Fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks. She is also a member of the European Leadership Network. Her work has appeared in publications such as the Hill, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Dr. Franz holds a master’s in public health policy from Harvard University and a doctorate in medicine from Julius-Maximilians University of Würzburg.